Ukraine expands its push into Kursk, a report blames Kyiv for the Nord Stream attack, and Kosovo risks clashes with NATO over a bridge reopening
August 12-18 in Eastern Europe
What You Need To Know:
This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories
1. Ukraine continued to expand its operations in Kursk and carried out an attack on four Russian airbases as Russia attacked Ukraine’s Sumy
Ukrainian forces moved further into Russia’s Kursk Oblast last week, securing control over Sudzha, the largest town in the region’s border area, and destroying three key bridges that threatened Russian supply lines as Moscow’s forces continued to scramble to respond to the incursion. Perhaps buoyed by Ukraine’s success in Kursk, Joe Biden stated he is “open” to sending long-range missiles to Ukraine that would significantly expand its abilities to strike Russian positions behind the frontlines. Ukraine showcased its ability to conduct such strikes last week even without long-range missiles though, hitting four Russian airfields on a single night in its largest single drone attack on Russian bases yet. Meanwhile, Russia continued its assault on Ukrainian cities, striking the city of Sumy, which lies near the border of Kursk Oblast.
Why it matters: Two weeks after it began, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk has shifted the war’s direction and degraded trust in Moscow’s military leadership for many Russians (read more on this in my analysis for UnHerd). It has also reportedly derailed planned indirect negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on a partial ceasefire related to strikes on energy infrastructure in both countries, which would have limited Ukraine’s ability to undermine the Russian army’s fuel supplies. According to Zelensky, the goals of the Kursk offensive now include not only improving Ukraine’s negotiating position in future peace talks, but also creating a buffer zone against Russian attacks into Ukrainian territory and a wholesale degradation of Russia’s ability to wage war in the country. Ukrainian strikes on Russian bases further advanced this aim, although its ability to strike more decisively against Russia remains hampered by its lack of long-range Western missiles.
2. A WSJ report alleged that Ukraine was behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack, leading to a spat between Germany and Poland
A report in The Wall Street Journal has claimed that a small Ukrainian team of both active duty soldiers and civilians ruptured the Nord Stream gas pipeline leading from Russia to Germany in September 2022. The article alleged that the plan had been directed by then-head of the Ukrainian army Valerii Zaluzhny and that Zelensky had initially approved it before calling it off at the CIA’s direction. Zelensky and Zaluzhny have since both denied the report, as have other Ukrainian agencies, while a German MP said the report could unwittingly be part of a disinformation operation. Germany had issued an arrest warrant in June for a Ukrainian man previously based in Poland who left for Ukraine before Polish authorities could detain him. A former German intelligence chief also claimed that Poland had likely supported the alleged plot, leading Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to deny the charges and to call on Germany to “apologize” for building the pipeline in the first place.
Why it matters: While this is not the first time that allegations have surfaced about Ukraine’s potential involvement in the Nord Stream sabotage case, this is the first instance in which they have been accompanied by formal steps to go after alleged Ukrainian participants, with an arrest warrant issued well before the article’s publication. Despite Ukrainian denials, it is likely that the report will have an impact on German-Ukrainian relations down the line, even though Germany maintains that it continues to stand by Ukraine’s war effort. The diplomatic scuffle between Germany and Poland on the matter highlights the stark difference in Western and Eastern European approaches to the Nord Stream pipeline and pre-2022 relations with Russia — whereas the Nord Stream sabotage was a breach of national security for Germany, for Poland, it was just comeuppance for Berlin’s flirtations with Putin.
3. Kosovo prepared to re-open a bridge linking ethnic Serb and Albanian areas, sparking fears of clashes with NATO and US troops
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti made preparations this past week to reopen the controversial bridge connecting the ethnic Albanian and Serb halves of the divided town of Mitrovica in north Kosovo, which has served as a lightning rod for tensions between the two peoples since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999. The bridge has remained closed to vehicle traffic since then, as Serbs in north Mitrovica claimed that campaigns of “ethnic cleansing” would be levied against them if it were to be reopened. The US and NATO, which maintains a peacekeeping force in Kosovo, have vociferously condemned any attempt by Kosovo to reopen the bridge in fears that it would spark ethnic tensions. Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani stated reopening the bridge would risk putting police in conflict with US and NATO forces, who have stated they are ready to blockade the bridge with troops to maintain its closure.
Why it matters: Serbs in Kosovo have been on edge since last year’s clashes involving mayoral elections in the country’s north, all while Serbia and Kosovo have both taken steps that have escalated tensions in the area. Despite likely being largely symbolic, the Mitrovica bridge’s opening would be interpreted as a signal of aggression by majority-Albanian Kosovo against the Serb minority in its north, potentially reigniting ethnic clashes and drawing in Western peacekeeping forces. Given that the US, NATO, and the EU have signaled they would forcibly resist efforts to reopen the bridge, Kurti’s unilateral move would not only isolate Kosovo, but could also see Western forces clash with Kosovar security forces for the first time in decades.
4. Poland indicted a recently swapped Russian prisoner of espionage and revealed charges against an alleged Polish collaborator
Poland has formally indicted Russian-Spanish spy Pavel Rubtsov with espionage after he was returned to Russia from detention in Poland in the prisoner exchange that freed US journalist Evan Gershkovich earlier this month. Polish prosecutors also revealed that a Polish journalist, widely known to be Rubtsov’s ex-girlfriend while he was posing as a journalist in Poland, is also facing charges for allegedly acting as an accessory to espionage in the case. While the degree to which the Polish journalist was involved in Rubtsov’s work with the Russian GRU remains unclear, Polish prosecutors would reportedly only be able to charge her with such a crime if they had enough evidence to suggest she was aware that she was helping Rubstov.
Why it matters: While Rubtsov’s indictment for spying changes little given his presence in Russia, revelations about his alleged journalist collaborator in Poland came as a shock to the media scene in the country, and showcase how deeply Russian interests had become embedded in Polish journalistic scene. Given that Rubstov was himself posing as a journalist, it is possible that the ongoing case may result in additional pressure on the Polish press by authorities cracking down on Russian influence — with significant potential for collateral damage.
5. Estonia disputed a Chinese probe that claimed that a Hong Kong-flagged ship had ‘accidentally’ severed a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea
Estonia’s Minister of Defense questioned the findings of a Chinese investigation that found that the Hong Kong-flagged ship NewNew Polar Bear had ruptured the Balticconnector gas pipeline running between Estonia and Finland by “accident” in October 2023, leading Chinese authorities to urge both governments to remain “objective” as probes continue in Tallinn and Helsinki. The Chinese findings indicate that the ship, which later docked in St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk in Russia, damaged the pipeline as a result of a storm, even though there were no storms reported in the Gulf of Finland that day.
Why it matters: The Balticconnector pipeline was built in an effort to wean Estonia and Finland off of Russian energy, and provided Estonia with almost all of its natural gas after 2022. Although leaders have praised China’s cooperation with the investigations into the matter, Beijing’s claim that the damage was accidental is unlikely to satisfy the Estonian and Finnish publics. Both countries are already distrustful of China given its increasingly close ties to Russia, which would seem to benefit from the disruption of natural gas flows between Estonia and new NATO member Finland.
Other trends to watch:
— In response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko stated that Russia was prepared to send troops to Belarus if Ukraine violated its borders. Lukashenko had recently claimed that Ukrainian forces had violated its airspace.
— Security experts expressed worries about the geopolitical impact of Latvia’s effort to phase out Russian-language education, which had long served ethnic Russian communities living in the country.
— Croatia announced it would reintroduce a military draft in the country starting January 2025.
— Polish President Andrzej Duda signed a law loosening restrictions on firearm use by armed forces on the Poland-Belarus border. I covered the specifics about the law and the controversy surrounding it last month.
— A Polish court has ordered the country’s Institute of National Remembrance to reopen an investigation into the forced relocation of ethnic Ukrainians and related ethnic groups by Poland’s communist government following WWII.
— Construction is underway on NATO’s largest base to date in eastern Romania.
— Poland recorded the EU’s largest annual and fastest quarterly GDP growth in the second quarter of 2024.