Ukraine retreats from Kursk, Vance squashes Polish request for nukes, and Serbia sees its largest street protest ever

March 11-17, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Mar 18, 2025

Drone footage of Serbia’s largest protest ever in Belgrade on Saturday (Screenshot via The Guardian/YouTube)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. Putin placed conditions on a potential ceasefire with Ukraine as Ukrainian forces were driven from Russia’s Kursk Oblast

In a long-hoped for detente in relations last week, the US and Ukraine agreed to support a 30-day ceasefire in the War in Ukraine during negotiations in Saudi Arabia, after which the Trump administration resumed intelligence sharing and military aid shipments to Kyiv that it had previously controversially halted. However, despite claims from Trump that talks with Russia on the ceasefire had been “positive,” Putin outlined several conditions to such a ceasefire, namely relating to Ukraine’s position in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to rearm during the ceasefire period. The first concern appeared to answer itself however, as Ukrainian forces collapsed in Kursk last week, and ceded almost all the territory they had held since August 2024 in the region to Moscow nearly overnight. Battles continued to rage in the region on Sunday as Russian troops advanced on the remaining pockets of Ukrainian control in the area. Meanwhile, British PM Keir Starmer condemned Putin’s approach to the ceasefire, and said that the planning for a post-war peacekeeping force deployed to Ukraine had entered its “operation phase.”

Why it matters: Ukraine’s loss of Kursk deprives them of a significant bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia, and represents a key public relations victory for Putin and the Russian military. Despite the resumption in US intelligence sharing and aid to Ukraine, it is very likely that Ukraine’s retreat from Kursk was at least partially a consequence of the Trump administration cutting Ukraine off from targeting systems, satellite data, and intelligence capabilities that its military had been dependent on throughout the conflict. Russia’s waffling on the 30-day ceasefire proposal was entirely predictable, and underscores yet again how uninterested Putin truly is in adjusting his war aims despite the various political gifts Trump has given him over the last month. Trump has continued to parrot Russian talking points last week, including on Kursk and Crimea, so it seems very possible that his talks with Putin on this ceasefire will end with Trump moving even closer to Russia’s point of view, rather than the opposite. Whatever the outcome of the meeting however, Putin’s insistence that the ceasefire be conditional sets it up for failure, leaving Trump with two options — put pressure on Russia to soften its terms, or more likely, force Zelensky to again yield on key points to satisfy Trump’s desire for a “win” on Ukraine.

2. J.D. Vance shut down suggestions from Polish President Duda that the US deploy nuclear weapons to Poland

Following Polish PM Donald Tusk’s suggestion the previous week that Poland should look to nuclear options to guarantee its own security in light of Trump’s shift away from Europe, Polish President Andrzej Duda took things to the next level this week and called on the US to deploy nuclear weapons on Polish soil. Poland had previously entertained the idea of being included within France’s nuclear umbrella, but because only the US has historically provided nuclear weapons for nuclear sharing, only Washington would be able to station nukes directly in Poland itself. Nevertheless, US VP J.D. Vance was quick to pour cold water on Duda’s request, saying he “would be shocked” if Trump were to support such a move. The US State Department followed by stating that its relationship with Poland was “ironclad,” but suggested it was not ready to move its nuclear weapons further eastward in NATO.

Why it matters: Moving nuclear weapons to Poland would be a highly significant change in American nuclear policy — currently, the US has vowed not to deploy nuclear warheads to any country admitted to NATO after 1997, which includes Poland and the rest of NATO’s east. Duda’s gambit was certainly ill-timed and clearly not completely thought out, which has resulted in quite a bit of finger-pointing within Poland’s polarized political environment. Nevertheless, Vance’s eagerness to publicly and quickly disparage Duda’s request serves as yet another indication that even a country like Poland, which despite boasting “ironclad” commitment from the US on paper, must also prepare to be humbled if it seeks more robust help from America. It’s no wonder then that even Warsaw, arguably Washington’s closest current ally in the EU, is turning to France and even Turkey in hopes of shoring up more stalwart allies as it stares down a potentially even more aggressive Russia post-Ukraine.

3. Serbs held the largest protest in Serbia’s history and called for the resignation of President Vučić, who admitted “change” was needed

Four and a half months since they began, protests in Serbia reached stunning new heights last week — 325,000 people took to the streets in Belgrade on Saturday in the largest protest in the country’s history. The demonstrations that started after the deadly collapse of a train station roof have evolved into broad anti-corruption and anti-government actions, recently focusing on the long-ruling president of the country, Aleksandar Vučić. Despite scaring protestors with arrests and heavy sentences for any violent incidents, Vučić has said that his government has “understood the message” and admitted that “change” needs to take place in the country. The day after the mass protest in Belgrade, authorities denied allegations that they had used military-style sonic weapons disperse otherwise peaceful demonstrators, as opposition leaders said they would file a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights over the alleged incident.

Why it matters: The protests have for nearly 5 months now been creating an unprecedented domestic challenge to Vučić’s government, and have already resulted in the resignation of Vučić’s prime minister in January. Vučić hoped that this move would serve as a satisfactory sacrificial lamb to calm the protests, but this has not come to pass — instead, it appears ever more likely that he will be forced to eventually hold early elections, despite his claims to the contrary. While Serbia is certainly far from a fully democratic state, it is also not Putin’s Russia, and placating a widely popular revolt of this kind is not easy for Vučić. He may choose to continue sitting this out in hopes it will fade on its own — but by all indications, popular anger in Serbia is only growing stronger, making it more difficult than ever for the president to project power across the Western Balkans and influence events in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere at a critical moment for Serbia’s reach in the region.

4. Bosnia’s separatist region moved to allow the creation of its own army and courts as its leader Dodik goaded authorities to arrest him

Tensions in Bosnia continued to escalate last week as the Serb-majority Republika Srpska entity that makes up one half of the country adopted a new draft constitution that allows for the creation of a separate military force and court system that would not be subject to federal authority in Sarajevo. The draft also gives Republika Srpska the right to form confederations with other countries — an obvious reference to the entity’s long running desire to secede from Bosnia and join Serbia proper. Milorad Dodik, the leader of the entity whose criminal sentencing touched off the current crisis, publicly goaded state prosecutors to arrest him, one day after a warrant had been issued against him. In response, the state court of Bosnia issued a nationwide warrant for the arrest of Dodik and two confidantes in the country.

Why it matters: The crisis in Bosnia constitutes the most severe threat to peace in the entire Balkan region since the wars of the 1990s, and shows no signs of slowing. As I mentioned last week, there are few off ramps for either Dodik or state authorities in Sarajevo, as giving in to the others’ demands at this phase to avoid further instability would undermine the authority of each party’s respective political power. Bosnia thus appears trapped in a cycle of escalation that may only be resolved through outside mediation or intervention. At a moment of uncertainty over Ukraine and Europe itself however, NATO and the EU, which have traditionally been involved in keeping the peace in Bosnia since the 90s, have little capacity to deal with the potential for renewed violence in Bosnia — nevertheless, as things grow more dire, they may have no choice than to get involved more decisively in the country.

5. Amid mounting pressure from the opposition, Hungary’s Orbán vowed a crackdown on NGOs, media, and Western-backed groups

Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán further escalated his rhetoric toward NGOs and opposition media on Saturday, equating them to a “shadow army” funded by liberal Europe and threatening to crack down on political groups and journalists that receive funds from abroad, whom he likened to insects. Orbán’s moves came as the increasingly popular Tisza Party, headed by Peter Magyar, held a 10,000 strong rally in Budapest the same day. The party, which has built a reputation through its strong anti-corruption message, has consistently polled evenly with or above Orbán’s Fidesz Party over the last year.

Why it matters: Despite his ally Trump’s arrival in office in the US, Orbán undoubtedly feels the heat domestically with Tisza and Magyar hot on his heels, and his increasingly radical rhetoric and policies are in part a reflection of this rising insecurity. Nevertheless, his latest moves threaten to stamp out the remaining vestiges of independent media and civil society in Hungary, which have been weakened significantly by the Trump administration’s foreign aid freeze. Orbán may see such a crackdown as his only way to weaken Magyar’s movement, but in the long term, it is unlikely to succeed, especially as Orbán continues to draw the ire of EU states like Estonia, which revived calls last week to suspend Hungary’s voting rights in the European Parliament. Despite his frequent clashes with Brussels, Orbán relies on EU funding to enrich his political circle, meaning that significant pressure from the bloc would hurt his bottom line much more than he would like to admit.

The Eastern Flank

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