Ukraine destroys 1/3 of Russia's bombers, Eurosceptic Nawrocki wins in Poland, and Putin scolds Serbia for arming Kyiv

May 27-June 3, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Jun 03, 2025

Poland’s president-elect Karol Nawrocki at a CPAC event in Poland last week (DHSgov via Wikimedia Commons)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. Ukraine launched a sophisticated drone attack across Russian bases, destroying 40 aircraft including nuclear capable jets

Russia and Ukraine met once again in Istanbul on Monday for only one hour, during which Moscow once again refused to agree to the unconditional ceasefire Europe and Ukraine have been pushing it to accept. Russia’s peace terms seem to have become even more radical, with Putin reportedly demanding that NATO halt all eastward enlargement in return for an end to the war. But the real show of the past few days of the conflict has taken place on the battlefield, on Russian soil no less — early on Sunday, Ukrainian drones, smuggled into Russia in the roofs of trucks without the drivers’ knowledge, destroyed 41 Russian jets at airbases across the country, including long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Carried out by the SBU, the plan was codenamed Operation Spiderweb, and had been in the works for a year and a half. According to the agency, the destroyed aircraft included supersonic jets, highly prized A-50 surveillance planes, and large Tu-95s, which are able to carry nuclear weapons and cruise missiles, altogether causing an estimated $7 billion in damage. Reportedly, Trump was not notified of the attack before it took place. Following the operation, Ukraine also carried out an attack on the Kerch Bridge connecting Russian-occupied Crimea to mainland Russia, suspending traffic on the roadway on Tuesday.

Why it matters: The attack, which Ukraine claims destroyed more than a third of Russia’s entire strategic bomber fleet, has already been dubbed “Russia’s Pearl Harbor” by Russian military bloggers, and has likely significantly undermined Moscow’s ability to carry out bombing raids against Ukrainian cities. Even though Russia has continued to advance on the battlefield in Ukraine itself, Operation Spiderweb was an attempt to demonstrate to Moscow, in dramatic fashion, that there are serious costs to continuing its war effort ahead of this month’s peace talks. More generally, the attack once again highlighted Ukraine’s capacity to innovate even at this stage in the war, and showcased the broad applications that FPV drones have in the future of modern warfare — indeed, given the immense distances involved, an operation of this scale would have been impossible to carry out with missiles or other conventional weapons of the 20th century. Although drone warfare has already changed how wars are fought, Operation Spiderweb has demonstrated that there numerous use cases for drone technology that as of yet remain untapped. In the context of the ongoing, yet fruitless, peace negotiations in Turkey, this operation shows that Ukraine views the talks in their current form as an unserious sideshow that cannot succeed unless Russia is humiliated enough to start making concessions.

Smoke from burning Russian jets at an airbase in Russia (@sentdefender via X)

2. In a dramatic, razor-thin finish, conservative Eurosceptic Nawrocki won the second round of Poland’s presidential elections

Despite winning the first round of voting in May, centrist candidate Rafał Trzaskowki, an ally of PM Donald Tusk, lost to conservative, Trump-backed candidate Karol Nawrocki in the second round of Poland’s presidential election on Sunday, dealing a major blow to Tusk’s government and the future of his coalition. Trzaskowski initially appeared on track to win, especially after the first exit polls showed him ahead of Nawrocki, but by Monday morning, it became clear that Nawrocki had inched ahead, garnering 50.89% of the vote. Nawrocki is backed by the Right-wing populist Law and Justice Party that had governed Poland from 2015 to 2023, and under Poland’s semi-presidential system, will serve as a counterweight to Donald Tusk’s coalition much like Andrzej Duda has since 2023. In response to Nawrocki’s win, Tusk stated he will hold a vote of confidence in his government on June 11 as a show of strength.

Why it matters: Although Nawrocki’s win will not radically alter Polish politics in the short-term, it means that Tusk’s government will be largely unable to pass its ambitious reform agenda thanks to Nawrocki’s presidential veto — potentially setting the stage for a period of all-out populist rule in Poland after the parliamentary election in 2027 that Tusk and his allies are likely to lose. The election sends a strong signal to Tusk and to Europe that Poland’s populist Right is only growing in strength, especially because a majority of young people voted for Right-wing candidates in both rounds of voting. Nawrocki however is not as radical as other populists like George Simion in Romania, and is broadly supportive of NATO, strengthening the Polish military to deter Russia, and Ukraine’s defense. Nevertheless, in an effort to bring far-Right voters to his side after the first round, he endorsed a broad platform that included opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine, in stark contrast to statements issued the Polish government last week, and has voiced a “Poland First” agenda that has often taken aim at Ukrainians living in Poland. In his reply to Zelensky’s message of congratulations on X, Nawrocki spoke positively about Polish-Ukrainian ties, but mentioned “solving overdue historical issues” as a key cornerstone of the relationship. These historical issues include the WWII-era Volhynia massacres that saw Ukrainian nationalists killed up to 100,000 ethnic Poles — an event that has featured prominently in Nawrocki and other Right-wing candidates campaigns. With Poland’s political star on the rise in Europe, Nawrocki’s potentially contentious attitude toward Ukraine, coupled with the prospect of a Right-wing government in Poland come 2027, means that the country’s path to the top of the EU’s political hierarchy may well be hampered — but given Poland’s advantageous position geopolitically in Europe, his win is unlikely to hold back its ambitions for long.

3. Russia has accused Serbia’s defense industry of sending weapons to Ukraine through NATO countries, prompting a joint investigation

The SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence agency, has accused Serbia’s defense sector of funneling Serbian-made weapons to Ukraine through third countries, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and countries in Africa, calling the development “a stab in the back” and accusing weapons manufacturers in Serbia of seeking to “profit from the blood of fraternal Slavic peoples.” Serbia’s pro-Russian President Aleksandar Vučić, who was one of only two European leader to attend the Victory Day Parade in Moscow in May, denied the accusations, and made arrangements for Serbia and Russia to jointly investigate the weapons shipments. Last year, Serbian ammunition worth $855 million was also reportedly sent through interlocutors to Ukraine.

Why it matters: Even though Serbia officially presents itself as neutral in the War in Ukraine, it has deep ties to Russia going back over a century, and Vučić has always sought to maintain its relationship with Moscow despite concurrent efforts to join the EU. The SVR’s fiery public statement denouncing the alleged weapons shipments is a rare slap on Serbia’s wrist, and was likely meant to remind Belgrade of Russia’s influence and power in the country, especially at a moment of weakness for Vučić’s government amid continued student protests. Although Vučić denied the SVR’s claims, it is unlikely he had no knowledge of the shipments, especially considering this is not the first time this has happened. In Serbia’s balancing act between Russia and the EU, it may well be in Vučić’s interest to arm Ukraine, both as an expression of Serbia’s independence within Russia’s world, and as a means of countering Russia’s efforts to cleave the five occupied regions away from Ukraine through referendums. Serbia has always viewed these moves with suspicion since the beginning of the war, since the precedent they set may be used to legitimize Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 with the West’s backing. Whatever is going on behind the scenes however, Putin’s decision to publicly admonish Vučić suggests that the relationship is under more stress than outside observers may be aware of.

4. Ahead of a process to adopt the euro, Bulgarians protested against joining the eurozone amid economic fear and disinformation

Four days before Bulgaria was set to receive the go-ahead from the EU to adopt the euro as its currency, protestors across major cities in the country demanded a referendum on the matter and advocated for keeping the Bulgarian lev, arguing that the euro’s adoption would increase inflation and drive Bulgarians into poverty. In Sofia, the protests were dominated by Bulgarian nationalists and supporters of the pro-Russian Vazrazhdane Party. In addition to voicing some legitimate concerns about inflation (which experts say would likely be minor in Bulgaria’s case), the campaign against Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro has been awash with disinformation about losses of savings, the introduction of a digital currency, and beyond. Protests against the euro have increased after Bulgarian President Rumen Radev offered to hold a referendum on the matter, before his proposal was rejected by the country’s pro-EU parliamentary majority.

Why it matters: Despite some legitimate objections, much of the opposition to Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro is based on disinformation and nationalistic fervor, whipped up by populist groups, and at times, by pro-Russian actors whose divisive rhetoric serves the Kremlin’s interests. Although Bulgaria is the only EU country currently on track to join the eurozone, it is not the only one facing pressure from nationalists opposed to such moves — in Poland for instance, Right-wing candidate Sławomir Mentzen has made opposition to the euro a key part of his campaign. The response to the euro in Bulgaria offers a cautionary tale about the future of the euro in an Eastern Europe that is growing more nationalistic, sovereigntist, and anti-Brussels, and demonstrates how the issue can indeed be weaponized by actors loyal to Russia.

5. Citing a constitutional amendment, police in Budapest denied a request to hold a LGBTQ pride march

Following the passage of a law allowing the state to ban public events held by the LGBTQ community in Hungary, which was later codified as a constitutional amendment, Budapest police have denied a request by an LGBTQ group to hold a pride event in the city, claiming that it could not be guaranteed that people under the age of 18, what it called “passive victims,” would not incidentally be exposed to “legally prohibited conduct.” The laws cited are framed as “child protection” measures, and ban the “promotion” of homosexuality to minors. In May, 20 EU countries called on Hungary’s government to walk back its ban, while organizers of Budapest’s main pride parade have stated they would hold the event despite the ban.

Why it matters: These latest moves by Hungary set up a potentially explosive confrontation between state authorities and pride organizers in Budapest that will serve as a key litmus test for how far the government is willing to go to crackdown on LGBTQ culture in the country. If pride organizers do indeed move forward with attempts to hold pride events, which have historically drawn tens of thousands of attendees, the resulting violence and wave of arrests is likely to send shockwaves through Europe, further isolating Orbán at a moment when his position in power appears more under threat than ever.

The Eastern Flank

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