Trump threatens Russia, countries scramble to solve cascading energy crises, and Slovakia's government faces collapse

January 21-26, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Jan 27, 2025

Trump speaking at Davos (Screenshot via The Telegraph/YouTube)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. Trump threatened to target Russian oil and place new sanctions on Moscow as Sec. of State Rubio halted non-military aid to Ukraine

A week on from Trump’s inauguration, key parts of his Ukraine policy have finally started to take shape, notably his approach to Russia. Trump has threatened Moscow and “various other participating countries” with sanctions and tariffs on his social media site Truth Social if Putin doesn’t end the war in Ukraine, and subsequently at Davos, promised to pressure Saudi Arabia and OPEC to reduce the price of oil in order to threaten Russia’s economy. Concurrently however, Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio froze US aid for Ukraine as part of the new administration’s 90-day freeze on foreign aid, leading US diplomats to push for an exemption to the order for Kyiv. Ukraine’s Zelensky however stated that the US has not halted military aid to the country, and that weapons have continued to flow to Ukraine despite the order.

Why it matters: Much still remains unclear about how Trump will push Russia to the negotiating table on Ukraine and what kind of deal he will pursue, but his position increasingly appears to be shifting to a confrontational one towards Russia. Additional sanctions or tariffs on Moscow itself will likely have little impact due to Russia’s economic isolation from the US — but if such measures target other countries that continue to trade with Russia, many of them may decide that their ties to Moscow are more of a liability than an asset in the medium-term. Trump’s threat to force the price of petroleum down would be a much more potent weapon against Russia, but may potentially take many months to yield concrete results. Putin on the other hand has responded to Trump’s threats with flattery, signaling an interest in striking a grand bargain that goes well beyond the war in Ukraine and includes “all areas that are of interest to both the U.S. and Russia.” Although Trump has not made his intentions clear directly so far, there are indications that he may too be interested in such far-reaching talks — with or without Ukraine’s direct diplomatic participation.

2. From Slovakia, to Moldova, to Bosnia, Eastern European states scrambled to find solutions to a deepening Russian gas crisis

Ukraine’s refusal to renew a Russian gas transit deal through its territory at the start of this year continued to have reverberations in Central Europe, as the EU stated it would continue negotiations with Ukraine on potential solutions with Hungary and Slovakia included in the process. Ukraine said it had no intention of renewing the transit of Russian gas, but said it could transit gas from Azerbaijan, which Europe has seen as a potential alternative to Russia for its energy needs. In Moldova, efforts to contain the impact of Russia’s decision to cut gas to the country’s Moscow-backed region of Transnistria ramped up as well, with the EU sending 30 million euros to alleviate the energy crisis as part of emergency steps it had agreed upon with the government of Moldova proper. After talks with Moldova’s president Maia Sandu, Ukraine’s Zelensky said his country could also provide coal to assist the region. Meanwhile in Bosnia, despite political jockeying within the country’s ethnically-divided political system, the government last week finally approved the construction of a new gas pipeline to reduce reliance on Russian energy.

Why it matters: The energy concerns facing Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Bosnia, and beyond are all interrelated, and are symptoms of the dramatic and fundamental transformations underway in Europe as it continues to deal with the secondary impact of the war in Ukraine and the new NATO-Russia shadow war. The EU-Ukraine negotiations are critical for countering Russia’s ability to influence governments in Slovakia and Hungary, and the impact of the situation is already becoming apparent — Hungary has agreed to drop its veto of continued EU sanctions against Russia likely in part due to the bloc’s moves to negotiate with Ukraine on its behalf. In Moldova, the combined efforts by the EU, Ukraine, and the government in Chișinău to relieve the humanitarian crisis in Transnistria is an effort to roll back the Kremlin’s control of the territory and eventually to bring it back under Moldovan jurisdiction. Although Russia has deftly wielded its energy reserves as a cudgel against NATO and its allies so far, these current shifts may be the start of a significant erosion of Russia’s remaining influence in parts of the region. It may have long-term impacts across Europe as well — Polish President Duda stated that European energy connections to Russia should never be reopened, even after a peace deal in Ukraine.

3. 100,000 people protested against PM Fico’s government in Slovakia as his ruling coalition teetered on the edge of collapse

Up to 100,000 people demonstrated in the capital Bratislava and in 20 other cities across Slovakia on Friday against PM Robert Fico’s diplomatic closeness to Russia and his spats with the EU and NATO. The protests have come as Fico’s government has accused politicians in the opposition of plotting a coup without providing evidence. Yet his government appears on the brink of collapsing on its own without the need for external pressure — after four members of the governing coalition were either expelled from their respective party blocs in parliament or stated the would not vote in the chamber, Fico’s coalition has de facto lost its majority in parliament. Fico has refused to resign, but has admitted that early elections remain a possibility.

Why it matters: With pressure mounting on Slovakia’s streets and within his own governing bloc, Fico’s days in power in Slovakia appear numbered. For now, Fico will try to wrangle his political allies to figure out a quick fix to his coalition’s problems in order to avoid elections. Yet as one of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán’s few remaining allies in Europe, Fico’s potential exit from power would likely be a chance for Slovakia to reform its institutions and re-enter the good graces of the NATO and EU mainstream, further isolating Budapest.

4. Sweden seized a Bulgarian ship suspected of damaging a Latvian undersea cable as Estonia warned about Russian energy provocations

Following several previous attempts to damage cables in the Baltic, Sweden seized and boarded a Bulgarian-owned ship on suspicion that it had ruptured an undersea fiber-optic cable, this time between the Swedish island of Gotland and Latvia, which had been significantly damaged as a result of “external influence.” The ship had been sailing from the Russian port of Ust-Luga near St. Petersburg. Concurrently, as Estonia prepares to disconnect its power grid from Russia’s, the country warned of potential provocations by Moscow as the switch to the EU’s network takes place.

Why it matters: The ongoing cable war in the Baltic appears to be intensifying, as Russia continues to stage provocations in the region against the Baltic states and NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland. Despite increased NATO naval deployments and patrols into the sea this month, it appears disruptions have continued, likely pointing to the need for an even greater naval presence in the region, especially as attempts to damage such cables grow more serious. The potential involvement of a non-Russian vessel would yet again suggest that Moscow is outsourcing its shadow operations to commercial vessels from other states, but the fact the ship belongs to a company from Bulgaria, which is a NATO member, should be a significant red flag for the alliance. While Estonia stopped importing Russian electricity in May 2022, it has remained part of the same network as Russia and Belarus, meaning that while the impending switchover will have no impact on power supply, it could make the country’s grid more secure from Russian hybrid attacks.

5. Hungary refused to join other EU states in denouncing Lukashenko’s re-election in a sham vote in Belarus

Belarus’s dictator Lukashenko predictably announced victory in the country’s managed election on Sunday, winning a seventh term in office. The election was widely denounced as illegitimate by experts, Western countries, and the European Union, but Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán, who has long been close to Russia, notably refused to sign onto an EU statement rejecting the results of the election. Slovakia had initially also joined Orbán, before ultimately agreeing to the statement. Belarusian exiles in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and beyond staged protests condemning Lukashenko’s undemocratic vote.

Why it matters: Lukashenko’s win in Belarus further condemns the country to years of dictatorial rule, but hardly came as a surprise. Hungary’s decision to abstain from an EU statement condemning the election however marks a new low for the country under Orbán’s leadership, and showcases a desire for genuine closeness with not only Russia but one of Europe’s worst and longest ruling dictators as well.

The Eastern Flank

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