Trump says no new Russia sanctions, Kellogg will meet with Lukashenko, and Slovakia's Fico floats NATO exit

June 10-17, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Jun 18, 2025

The aftermath of the most recent Russian strikes in Kyiv, Ukraine on June 17, 2025 (State Emergency Service of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. Putin told Trump he’s ready for a new round of Ukraine talks as Trump suggested he won’t place any new sanctions on Russia

In characteristic fashion for the times, the Ukraine-Russia pace process took one step forward this past week, and two steps back. In a phone call, Putin told Trump he was ready to engage in new talks with the Ukrainians later this month as both sides completed reparations of over 1,000 war dead — before Moscow then launched a massive, 9-hour air assault on Kyiv that killed 10 and injured over 100. Perhaps more disappointingly though, even as Ukraine began implementing the minerals deal it had reached with Trump by opening up a lithium mine to foreign investors, Trump shocked attendees of the G7 summit by hinting that he would not be placing any more sanctions on Russia, while claiming that Russia should never have been ejected from the group. All this while Russia raised yet another condition for a ceasefire with Ukraine — that Kyiv destroy all Western-supplied weapons it has received.

Why it matters: If it wasn’t clear already, Trump’s decision to leave the G7 summit early, thus snubbing Zelensky and NATO head Mark Rutte who had hoped to hold talks with him, makes it clear that Ukraine is far from the US president’s top priority on the international stage — especially in light of Israel’s escalating war with Iran. There will likely never be a moment when Trump formally and openly states he is stepping back from mediating talks between the two sides, but his walkout from the summit may be the clearest indicator we’ll get. The events of the last week also make clear just how inconsequential the minerals deal may have been for Ukraine’s security — rather than providing Kyiv with American defense guarantees by giving Trump an economic incentive to defend Ukraine, not only has it failed to convince Trump to take a tougher stance against Russia, but it has failed to get him to take Ukraine seriously as an asset. Reportedly, European leaders had hoped to use the meetings at the summit to bring Trump back to their side and to push Russia once again to commit to a ceasefire — but at this stage, the belief that Trump is interested in anything of the sort may be just as delusional as the notion that Russia wants to end the war. In the context of an increasingly more dangerous world, it is about time that Europe and Ukraine realize that they are on their own.

2. Trump’s Ukraine envoy Kellogg will meet with Belarus’s Lukashenko, upending five years of US policy

According to Reuters, Trump’s envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg will travel to Minsk in the next few days to meet with Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, becoming the first high-level American official to meet with the leader since he stole the 2020 election in Belarus that led the opposition to flee the country. Trump has historically mused about trying to cleave Minsk away from Moscow, and has tacitly made moves in this direction, including efforts to negotiate the release of political prisoners in the country. The US had suspended diplomatic operations at its embassy in Minsk in 2022.

Why it matters: While Kellogg’s meeting with Lukashenko may ostensibly aim to convincing him to move away from Putin, it will likely achieve little other than legitimizing the Belarusian dictator and elevating his diplomatic profile in the Russian world. Belarus’s deep ties to Russia go back decades, and cannot easily be undone through the kinds of deals Trump typically likes to use to get world leaders to do his bidding. If the meeting moves the needle on the release of political prisoners in Belarus, this would be a tangible success for the Trump administration — but the likely very public nature of the meeting will do little other than further underscore Trump’s sympathetic attitude toward Moscow and its allies in the short-term, and possibly undermine years of EU and NATO efforts to isolate Lukashenko’s regime.

3. Slovak PM Fico floated the idea of leaving NATO while declaring support for Ukraine’s EU accession goals

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico raised eyebrows for two very different reasons last week. Yesterday, he announced that his government was in favor of Ukraine joining the EU, signaling a rare yet clear break with other Eastern European Rightists like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s president-elect Karol Nawrocki. The shift apparently took place after Slovakia received over 100 million euros from the EU for joint energy projects in Ukraine — something that has led the Slovak government’s website to declare that EU accession for Ukraine would bring “far more opportunities than drawbacks” for Slovakia. Concurrently however, in advance of the recent G7 summit, Fico stated that he may be interested in moving Slovakia toward geopolitical neutrality, implying an exit from NATO, as he criticized its growing defense spending. Interestingly though, Fico’s ally, Slovak President Peter Pelligrini, criticized the statement, claiming that leaving NATO would be more expensive for Slovakia than remaining in the alliance. The EU last week also passed a ban on Russian gas imports despite opposition from Orbán and Fico, undercutting Fico’s demand that the bloc postpone a vote on new Russia sanctions until the gas issue is ironed out.

Why it matters: Although unlikely, Slovakia’s exit from NATO would be unprecedented, and would open the door for much more direct Russian infiltration of Slovak politics and society — something that Fico seems open to facilitating given his closeness to Putin. Nevertheless, his openness to Ukrainian EU accession reveals two important things about his government: that even his deepest political convictions have a price, and that he may not be lying about steering Slovakia toward an independent foreign policy that plays Russia and the West off each other according to the country’s national interests. Overall though, Fico has already made Slovakia a pariah in the EU — meaning that no matter how much is views evolve on Ukraine, it won’t be enough to bring him and his country back into the European mainstream.

4. Polish PM Tusk’s government won a vote of confidence in Parliament as Poland ordered a partial recount of presidential ballots

In a moment laden with immense risk for his political future, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s decision to hold a parliamentary vote of confidence in his government following conservative Karol Nawrocki’s victory in the Polish presidential elections has paid off, with his government comfortably winning the support of lawmakers. For his part, Nawrocki outlined areas where he would be willing to work with Tusk’s government, including on tax issues, security, and certain social issues, but called Tusk a “liar” and made it clear he would not budge on issues like abortion. Also last week, citing irregularities, Poland’s Supreme Court ordered a partial recount of ballots in the election at several precincts — although the number of votes in question are not enough to meaningfully change the outcome.

Why it matters: Despite his government’s victory, Tusk’s decision to hold the vote of confidence in the first place indicates just how weak his position has become as a result of Nawrocki’s win — especially since, despite the vote of confidence, Tusk has announced that he will be undertaking a “government reconstruction” next month with several new members. His coalition had already been shaky to begin with, and this new realignment, despite being an attempt to iron out differences between its members, may only end up magnifying them. Ultimately, what this all means is that, even before 2027 parliamentary elections that will likely result in Tusk’s ouster as PM, his coalition may find itself in a tight spot when it comes to getting anything done in Poland — not just because of Nawrocki, but also because of its own shortcomings.

5. Latvia detained a former MP after investigating him for providing assistance to Russia

Latvia’s security service, the VDD, briefly detained ex-MP Aleksejs Rosļikovs, the leader of the country’s ethnic Russian party, after he shouted Russian-langauge slogans in support of Russians in Latvia’s parliament earlier this month, leading to his ejection from the body. This comes after the VDD launched an investigation into his conduct, both for his outburst in Parliament and allegedly “on suspicion of providing assistance” Russia. The charges carry with them a sentence of up to 20 years in prison.

Why it matters: While it is not immediately clear whether the charges of providing assistance to Russia point to any broader actions by Rosļikovs beyond his statements in Parliament, the incident points both to Moscow’s continued infiltration of European politics, and the growing tension between the Baltic states’ deeply anti-Russian geopolitical position and the convictions of their ethnic Russian minority populations. While the case against Rosļikovs may well be a nothing-burger, it certainly won’t be the end of Latvia and the rest of the Baltics’ struggle to clarify their relationship with their Russian-speaking citizens.

The Eastern Flank

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