Trump cuts weapons aid to Ukraine, Poland sets up anti-migrant border controls, and Russia courts Hungary to help its war effort

July 1-7, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Jul 07, 2025

Ukraine’s Zelensky at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania in September of last year. The weapons halted by Hegseth’s order included ammunition of the sort produced in the facility (President of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. The Trump administration halted shipments of vital weapons to Ukraine as Kyiv scrambled to find alternatives

The events of the last week have proven once again that Trump’s overtures to Europe at last month’s NATO summit, along with his harsh language toward Russia, amounted to little more than window-dressing. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth unilaterally halted the delivery of vital American ammunition for Ukraine that had been promised under the Biden administration, stating that they were needed to strengthen domestic US weapons stocks — a claim that has been denounced as baseless by Congressional Democrats. The paused shipments included Patriot missiles, Stinger missiles, and various other surface-to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles, and the shipments were reportedly already on the ground in Poland ready to be transferred to Ukraine when the order was announced. This marked the third time that such shipments were halted under Trump. Although Zelensky claimed that his latest call this past week with Trump was “fruitful” and the “most productive” one the pair had yet, he is clearly hedging his bets — last week, Ukraine explored new plans to have Europe purchase American weapons on its behalf rather than merely relying on American largesse. Russia meanwhile once again upped the ante and launched its largest barrage of missiles and drones on Ukrainian cities since the start of the war on Friday, and has reportedly increased its use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. Additionally, according to Kyiv, Russia is seeking to draw Laos into the war by involving its military in de-mining operations in the previously Ukrainian-occupied Kursk Oblast, while China stated last week that it will not accept a Russian loss in the War in Ukraine. Although Senator Lindsey Graham continued to push for the passage of his tariff bill targeting Russian trade partners, according to The New York Times, the Trump administration has been allowing the enforcement of existing sanctions against Russia to fall apart through apparent negligence.

Why it matters: To state the obvious, cutting off Ukraine’s supply of defensive missiles will dramatically undermine its ability to protect its cities, especially since the aid Hegseth halted was not new assistance, but a previously approved package the Ukrainians had already figured into their battlefield calculus. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, the cutoff will only embolden Russian aggression in the country, both in the skies and on the ground. More broadly though, it also contributes to an image of Trump’s Ukraine-Russia policy that is simultaneously contradictory, confused, and uncoordinated, and shows that any larger strategy the administration may have once had has clearly gone out the window. Even as the Pentagon announced the weapons stoppage, which included Patriot munitions, Trump bafflingly underscored how important Patriot systems were to Ukraine’s defense and expressed frustration with Putin even as he failed to take any decisive action against Moscow and allowed existing sanctions to wither. In a telling sign of this current state of affairs, when asked whether he still believes he’ll be able to end the conflict, Trump said for the first time on Friday that he doesn’t know. Although it is understandable why Zelensky continues to feel that he has to grovel at Trump’s feet given Europe’s inability to decisively arm Ukraine, the question is whether the headache of interfacing with the administration is truly worth it — especially when all Ukraine gets in return is humiliations, weapons cuts, and a soft US approach toward Russia.

2. Poland introduced checkpoints on its borders with Germany and Lithuania to curb migration as local citizen patrols formed

As part of a growing trend across the Schengen Zone, Poland put in place border checks along its frontiers with Germany and Lithuania last week to deter illegal migration, pledging to send as many as 5,000 soldiers to the borders as part of the effort. The move comes amid increasing domestic pressure on the center-left Polish government led by PM Donald Tusk to respond to both people smuggling and large-scale returns of migrants by German authorities into Poland, which reportedly number in the hundreds per month — despite having dropped since the previous, populist Polish government’s time in power. Germany and Lithuania both expressed disappointment with the new controls, as locals in Poland, backed by Right-wing parties, formed citizen patrols along the border, apparently to stop migrants from entering the country. The government has criticized the patrols, accusing them of spreading fear and disinformation about the scale of the problem.

Why it matters: This is not the first time that Poland has set up temporary controls along its borders to combat illegal migration, but in the context of an increasingly volatile climate on migration both domestically and across Eastern Europe, the checks underscore emerging threats to the viability of the open border policy of the Schengen Area itself. The flow of migrants into Poland through Schengen borders hardly amounts to a flood as Right-wing groups in Poland have alleged — but it appears that the defensive, insular populist narrative in Poland on the threat posed by migrants has moved beyond just the Polish-Belarusian border, where the Lukashenko regime has weaponized migrants since 2021, to Poland’s borders with more friendly neighbors within the EU. Since 2015, border checks have been introduced along many major borders within the Schengen Area, so far mostly in Western Europe — but with migration routes increasingly running through Eastern Europe, Poland is unlikely to be the last country to take such steps in the region, with countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Balkan states likely to follow suit. Although all of this hardly means an end to Schengen, it puts the EU’s open border policy at odds with the often divergent border approaches of its members, and raises questions about how to manage internal migration disputes without enflaming tensions across the bloc as a whole.

3. Russia’s foreign minister appealed to Hungary to collaborate with it on protecting ethnic minorities in Ukraine

Russia apparently increasingly sees Hungary as not just a spoiler within the EU and NATO, but a potential collaborator in its war effort in Ukraine itself. In an interview with Hungarian press, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Moscow and Budapest share a common goal in Ukraine to prevent the “persecution” of ethnic minorities, and that the two governments should “unite” in this purpose. This comes in the wake of a scandal in May in which Ukraine accused Hungary of spying on its southwestern Zakarpattia Oblast, which is home to a prominent Hungarian minority, and after Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán claimed that Ukrainians are increasing diplomatic attacks against Hungary due to its opposition to Kyiv’s EU bid. Separately last week, Denmark pushed to accelerate Article 7 proceedings within the EU that would suspend Hungary’s voting rights for violating the bloc’s rules.

Why it matters: Lavrov’s comments are hardly surprising given Hungary’s closeness to Russia, but the fact he openly suggested that a member of the EU and NATO could assist it in its war in Ukraine highlights the fact that Moscow understands what many still fail to see — that Hungary has become not just a black sheep of the Western order, but rather a state that is de facto part of Russia’s orbit in all but name. This is underscored by Orbán’s irredentist attitudes not just toward Ukraine, but also toward Romania’s Transylvania, where, according to the Lansing Institute, his government may be laying the groundwork for a hybrid campaign to undermine Romanian sovereignty over the Hungarian-majority parts of the region. It remains extremely unlikely that Orbán would resort to any kind of military action in either Romania or Ukraine, but hybrid warfare that serves Russian interests may certainly be in the cards.

4. Bosnia dropped its arrest warrant against separatist Bosnian Serb leader Dodik after he appeared before a prosecutor, diffusing crisis

In an shocking move, Bosnia’s public prosecutor dropped its arrest warrant against Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb separatist leader who for months had evaded arrest for undermining the country’s constitutional order, all while traveling internationally and declaring the national judiciary null and void on the territory of the Republika Srpska entity which he rules. The warrant against Dodik was dropped after he voluntarily appeared for questioning at the public prosecutor’s office in Sarajevo, but his release remains conditional on his returning for subsequent rounds of questioning.

Why it matters: Last week’s events mark the end of what had been called the most consequential power struggle in Bosnia & Herzegovina’s post-war history, which seemed for months like it could bring the country to the edge of violence once again. Although Dodik’s decision to appear for questioning was interpreted by many as a victory for the Bosnian state and the rule of law in the country, the reality is likely far more complicated — Dodik’s side had likely been negotiating with the Bosnian state behind the scenes in order to diffuse the situation in a mutually beneficial manner, and in many respects, he emerged from the affair shockingly politically unscathed. Having been able to retain his political position and his freedom while also enhancing the autonomy of Republika Srpska, Dodik arguably forced the Bosnian system to bend his power, rather than the other way around. What this will mean for Bosnia’s long-term future remains to be seen, but it is unlikely that Dodik will suddenly turn into a good faith actors in the country who sets aside his separatist ambitions.

5. Moldova’s pro-Russian bloc announced it would take part in the country’s elections as the EU held its first summit in Moldova

Top EU officials, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, gathered in the Moldovan capital Chișinău on Friday for the first-ever EU summit in Moldova, where leaders from the bloc underscored the country’s progress in meeting critical accession benchmarks and took part in talks on trade, security issues, and business investment. Von der Leyen also green-lit 270 million euros for Moldova at the summit, part of a nearly 2 billion euro package for the country’s development to be dispersed through 2027. Concurrently however, the country’s pro-Russian political block, which includes the banned, Russian-backed Shor Party and several politicians who are sanctioned by the US, stated it would take part in Moldova’s parliamentary elections in September, which Moldovan President Maia Sandu has framed as the determinant of Moldova’s EU future.

Why it matters: Against the backdrop of a Russia emboldened by Trump’s apparent choice to step back from the War in Ukraine and gathering pro-Moscow force in Moldova, the EU summit in Chișinău was likely meant as a show of force and a signal that even though Moldova isn’t part of the EU yet, it is already squarely in the bloc’s orbit. Although overtly Russian-backed actors like Shor’s coalition will likely use hybrid warfare strategies and disinformation to improve their chances in the September elections, Sandu is likely much more worried about the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, which currently hold the second largest share of seats in the country’s parliament. The showdown between the BCS and Sandu’s coalition is likely to be the final test on Moldova’s long path to EU accession — but if one were to bet on the future, the momentum continues to lie squarely with Sandu and her allies.

The Eastern Flank

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