Trump and Zelensky close in on mineral deal, Europe struggles to support Ukraine, and pro-Russian actors pressure EU states
February 18-24, 2025 in Eastern Europe
What You Need To Know:
This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories
1. After calling Zelensky a dictator, Trump and Ukraine moved closer to a deal on Ukrainian minerals as the US voted with Russia at the UN
In the week following the Donald Trump administration’s negotiation on Ukraine with Russia, Trump has continued to break norms left and right, suggesting Ukraine started the war with Russia, and calling Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” in a Truth Social post because Ukraine didn’t hold presidential elections last year due to the country’s continued state of martial law. Trump put pressure on Zelensky this week to hold elections following his team’s talks with Russia, suggesting Russian negotiators had raised this point as a condition for an eventual ceasefire. Trump’s online blow-up at Zelensky however was apparently triggered by the Ukrainian leader’s refusal to sign an agreement US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had presented to him on Ukraine’s mineral rights. Later in the week though, the American and Ukrainian sides had apparently moved closer to a deal on the matter, which, according to Axios, included a Reconstruction Investment Fund that would be co-managed by Ukraine and the US, and a vow to keep Ukraine “free, sovereign, and secure.” On the third anniversary of the start of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 however, the US voted with Russia at the UNGA against a resolution condemning its invasion of Ukraine.
Why it matters: The mineral deal has become a major focal point of US-Ukraine relations over the past two weeks as Zelensky has come to see it as his best shot at retaining some degree of security support from Trump’s Washington. Whatever the contours of the eventual deal will be, it will still be a rather weak solution for Ukraine, which will have to pin its hopes on the idea that giving Trump an economic stake in Ukraine’s resource wealth and its post-war reconstruction will incentivize him not to sell Kyiv out to Russia. Whether or not this translates to additional security assistance though remains to be seen, although given Trump’s attitude toward Russia, the chances are slim. However shocking Trump’s statements about Zelensky and Ukraine may be on their own, the fact they have been matched by concrete actions like the American vote at the UN suggests a wholesale shift in America’s approach to Russia, Ukraine, and European security at large. If it continues, it may well become the most consequential change in US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.
2. Europeans continued to struggle to find new ways to support Ukraine as Trump sent mixed signals about European security
In the wake of Trump’s recent statements on Ukraine and his administration’s repeated signals that Europe shouldn’t count on future American security support, European have continued to scramble to find ways to aid Ukraine’s defense without the US. The UK’s PM Keir Starmer vowed to send his own troops to guarantee Ukraine’s security after a peace deal, while Polish and Estonian leaders called on Europe to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine — but despite a visit by 13 European officials to Kyiv on Monday to demonstrate a show of support for Ukraine in the face of Trump’s changing approach, European leaders continued to find few concrete measures they could all agree on. In terms of the security of European NATO itself, Trump assured Poland’s President Andrzej Duda that the US was not planning to reduce its troop levels in the country, but the president’s late arrival to their meeting, which ended up lasting only 10 minutes rather than the agreed-upon hour, prompted consternation in Poland about Trump’s approach to the country.
Why it matters: Using frozen assets to assist Ukraine is likely Europe’s best bet right now to support Kyiv on its own, and despite Russia’s refusal to accept European forces on Ukrainian territory as part of a post-war peacekeeping force, proposals like Britain’s to field troops to the country will likely be the only way Ukraine’s sovereignty can be guaranteed after an eventual settlement. Nevertheless, Europeans’ continued failure to agree on a meaningful path forward bodes ill not only for Ukraine’s future, but the continent’s ability to protect itself in any unified fashion. Whether this leads to a strengthening of smaller, localized alliances outside of NATO or the EU remains to be seen — but as the security situation in Eastern Europe especially grows more dire, regionalization of this sort will become ever more likely.
3. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, pro-Russian forces challenged EU institutions and supported Trump’s rhetoric against the bloc
As Trump and his administration continue to sow division within the EU together with Russia, their efforts have been aided by sympathetic actors across the bloc’s East this past week. Protests supporting far-right, anti-Ukraine candidate Călin Georgescu in Romania, whose win in the country’s first round of elections was annulled by Romania’s top court last year due to undue Russian influence, sprung up in Bucharest on Saturday, with demonstrators holding signs thanking US Vice President J.D. Vance for mentioning the annulled elections in his infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference earlier this month. Meanwhile, predictably, Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán has once again become a thorn in the EU’s side as it has tried to renew sanctions against Russia and form a united front against Trump, stating that only Hungary will decide whether Ukraine will join the EU. Perhaps most dramatically though, around 1,000 national protestors belonging to a pro-Russian party in Bulgaria stormed the EU offices in Sofia in protest of the country adopting the euro by 2026.
Why it matters: The activities of pro-Russian leaders and parties in NATO and the EU’s East point to the continued divisions within many countries in the region on Ukraine and Russia — although in Romania and Bulgaria in particular, it is fringe, minority pro-Russian parties without widespread popular support that have nevertheless managed to challenge their nations’ established order. Once Russia’s hybrid war against NATO inevitably picks up post-Ukraine as Moscow senses a weakened Europe without robust American support, the Kremlin will doubtlessly do whatever it can to exploit these divisions, especially in frontline countries like Romania.
4. Poland’s populist opposition intensified its coup allegations against PM Tusk’s centrist coalition ahead of presidential elections
Poland’s Right-wing populist opposition intensified its claims this past week that Polish PM Donald Tusk and his centrist government are allegedly plotting a coup and planning to interfere in the country’s upcoming presidential elections in May. This comes after the head of Poland’s Constitutional Court, who was appointed by the country’s previous Right-wing ruling government, launched an inquiry into Tusk’s government over such allegations earlier this month. In response to such claims however, the ruling coalition has also raised concerns that the opposition-controlled Constitutional Court may annul any election result that doesn’t see its preferred candidate, Karol Nawrocki, take the presidency. At the present, the frontrunner in the race is mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski, a member of Tusk’s ruling party.
Why it matters: For Tusk and his allies, securing the presidency will allow them to complete a slew of ambitious rule of law reforms that have so far been blocked by President Andrzej Duda, making the election in May critical for the future of Poland’s judiciary. The coup allegations are only the latest sign of how polarized and toxic Poland’s political landscape has become, and especially how dangerous the continued politicization of the country’s courts is for the health of its democracy. Moreover, it shows that even if Trzaskowski wins in May, he will face an uphill battle securing legitimacy in Parliament, further destabilizing Poland’s domestic political scene.
5. The arrest of a Russian operative in Bosnia shed light on Russia’s training network in Serb-dominated parts of the country
The arrest of Alexander Bezrukovni, a Russian agent working in Bosnia who was extradited to Poland earlier this month for allegedly coordinating attacks against Poland, Germany, Moldova, the US, and beyond, has uncovered a previously unknown Russian network in the Balkan country. The operations were centered on the ethnically Serb-ruled Republika Srpska entity within Bosnia, whose leader, Milorad Dodik, has long been close to Putin. According to reports, Bezrukovni was directly aided by Serb groups in Republika Srpska.
Why it matters: Bosnia has long been a crucial theater of competition between Russia and the West in the Balkans, and its use as a Russian training ground for at-times violent attacks against EU states is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, the fact the network was exposed by the country’s security forces is a positive sign that, at least in the federal government in Sarajevo, institutions remain robust enough to challenge Russian activities in the ethnically and politically divided country.
Other stories to watch:
— NATO to reportedly extend jet fuel pipeline to Czechia, Poland in case of war with Russia (The Kyiv Independent)
— Georgia's richest man said to be moving funds to avoid US sanctions (BBC)
— Thousands rally in Slovakia to mark the 2018 slayings of an investigative journalist and his fiancee (Associated Press)
— Intelligence warns Russia ‘preparing for war with NATO’ (UK Defence Journal)
— Russia and Belarus will hold a joint military drill in September (Associated Press)
— Moldova urges clergy to "tell the truth" about Ukraine war (Reuters)
— Why is less Russian being taught at Estonian schools? (DW)