Russia moves against Ukraine's Sumy, Poland's Nawrocki opposes Kyiv's EU bid, and Moscow seeks to reinforce Transnistria

June 4-9, 2025 in Eastern Europe

Jun 09, 2025

Kharkiv, Ukraine in the aftermath of a Russian attack on June 7, 2025 (National Police of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons)

What You Need To Know:

This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories

1. Russian forces advanced into Ukraine’s Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions as Moscow launched biggest ever air assault on the country

Although Ukrainian and Russian diplomats continued to plan subsequent rounds of peace talks later this month, potentially even with a meeting between Zelensky, Putin, and Trump, the lingering fallout from Ukraine’s daring Operation Spiderweb drone attack continued to take center stage last week. US officials claimed that Russia was yet to carry out its massive multi-pronged response to Ukraine’s drone attacks last Sunday that took out a third of its strategic bomber fleet, even as Moscow pummelled Ukrainian cities with missiles and drones in reportedly the largest single assault of the war and Ukraine sent at least 10 drones in the direction of Moscow. Even though Trump was reportedly impressed with Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb strikes, calling them “badass” according to staffers, he was concerned they would prolong the conflict and undermine peace efforts. On the battlefield however, Russia has made some of its most significant recent gains last week, moving into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast after reaching the border of Donetsk Oblast and advancing to within 18 miles (29 km) of the city of Sumy, which Russia had previously tried to besiege in 2022.

Why it matters: The practical battlefield consequences of Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb are yet to unfold, and Ukraine is likely closely evaluating how it might be able to take advantage of the holes in Russia’s military architecture it has created. Key to translating the achievements of Operation Spiderweb into real tactical and strategic gains will be the continued use of air power not only against Russian assets in Russia, but also against Russian forces in Ukraine itself, which may find themselves much more exposed thanks to the hits Russia’s bombers and surveillance aircraft have taken. Ukraine has continued to demonstrate that it is focusing significant firepower on depleting Russian air reserves — it shot down a Russian Su-35 jet over Russia’s Kursk Oblast on Sunday. Russian moves in the direction of Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast however show that, at least for the short-term, Russia will continue to be able to take territory in Ukraine despite Kyiv’s strikes further afield, especially as Western (read American) arm shipments slow down. In a testament to the Trump administration’s shifting priorities, Zelensky’s office confirmed that a shipment of 20,000 anti-drone missiles for Ukraine had been redirected to reinforce US forces in the Middle East. Russia’s moves also underscore the fact that, despite its public rhetoric about only being interested in the Donbas, Russia will seize however much of Ukraine it can, including the country’s heartland — and that Trump’s continued desires to force Russia into a ceasefire deal will remain fruitless as long as this simple reality remains true.

2. Poland’s president-elect said he opposes Ukraine’s EU accession as Poland passed a law honoring the genocide of Poles by Ukrainians

Still riding high after his razor-thin election win on June 1, Poland’s president-elect Karol Nawrocki told Hungarian outlet Mandiner that although he supported Ukraine’s fight against Russia, he was against its entry into the EU due to the economic impact this would have on Poland, Hungary, and other eastern member states, denouncing “unfair competition” from Ukraine’s agriculture and logistics sectors. He also seemed to suggest that Ukraine’s entry into the EU would be contingent on Ukraine’s willingness to continue allowing exhumations of Polish mass graves from the period of the WWII-era Volhynia massacres, when Ukrainian nationalist militias killed up to 100,000 ethnic Poles in today’s western Ukraine — an issue that featured prominently in Nawrocki’s presidential campaign. Also last week, the Polish Sejm, the country’s parliament, voted nearly unanimously to create a day of national remembrance for these massacres and recognizing them as a genocide, triggering criticism from Ukraine, which stated the move “flies in the face of the spirit of good neighbourly relations”.

Why it matters: Ironically, Poland finds itself in the same position economically as Germany did in 2004 on the eve of Eastern European states’ entry into the EU, being similarly wary of the impact of cheap Ukrainian goods and agricultural products on Polish markets — although it is worth noting that Germany weathered the shift with minimal shocks to its long-term economic health. Nawrocki’s opposition both to Ukraine’s EU accession and its admission to NATO due to national sovereigntist concerns puts him in the same political camp as Hungary’s Orbán and Slovakia’s Fico, and although he is ardently anti-Russian unlike his two counterparts, he may be able to lend weight to their position on the European stage, especially as the head of state of the EU’s largest eastern member. The fact Nawrocki made his comments about Ukraine’s EU ambitions to a Hungarian outlet is significant, and indicates he is trying to develop his personal connections with Orbán and other Hungarian decision makers despite their differences. While Poland’s Sejm is hardly in league with Nawrocki on nationalistic historical issues, the fact the day of remembrance was passed into law shows that the Volhynia issue is important not just to ardent nationalists, but to a large segment of Polish society across the political spectrum. Although concrete steps are already being taken to resolve pain points between the two sides on the matter, Nawrocki’s focus on the issue may prove to undermine Polish-Ukrainian relations, especially as Ukraine moves forward with its EU accession bid.

3. Moldova stated Putin aims to station 10,000 additional troops in the Russian-backed territory of Transnistria to pressure Ukraine

In an interview with Financial Times, Moldova’s Prime Minister Dorin Recean claimed that intelligence reports indicated that Russia hopes to station an additional 10,000 soldiers in the breakaway, pro-Russian territory of Transnistria in order to put pressure on southwestern Ukraine, potentially opening up a new front in the area. Although deploying troops there currently remains geographically unfeasible because Transnistria is surrounded by Ukraine, NATO, and pro-European governments, Recean added that Russia is seeking to bring pro-Russian forces to power in Chisinau by meddling in the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections in order to facilitate such a military transfer. During the presidential election and EU referendum last year, Russia reportedly spent $39 million to influence the election through vote-buying — a scheme that ultimately proved unsuccessful.

Why it matters: Moldova has been the target of Russian disinformation, election interference operations, and hybrid warfare for years, meaning that, in light of these new revelations, Moscow clearly sees Moldova and Transnistria as critical for its long-term efforts to influence the battlefield in Ukraine. These findings also make it all the more important for NATO and Ukraine to ensure that Moldova remains in the EU’s orbit, and mean that this year’s parliamentary elections in the country, which had already been branded as the “final battle” for Moldova’s EU accession, will be a major showdown between Moldovan state security and Russian influence operations. Nevertheless, Moscow’s plans in Transnistria, together with its its hybrid warfare tactics, are unlikely to bear fruit — Russia’s influence operations have failed to move the needle in Moldovan politics even when spending tens of millions of dollars to do so, and there is little reason that would change anytime soon, especially given Moldova’s ever-deepening cooperation with the EU on energy security, defense, and development. For now, Russia’s 10,000-strong reinforcements to Transnistria are likely to remain little more than a pipe dream.

4. Bulgaria has delayed a vote on North Macedonia’s entry into the EU, accusing lawmakers of bias on thorny ethnic disputes

During recent deliberations about North Macedonia’s EU accession bid, the process appears to have fallen victim to decades-old intricacies of Balkan ethnic politics, with allegations of threats and disinformation campaigns to boot. Bulgarian members of the European Parliament forced the body to delay a key vote on a report regarding North Macedonia’s accession to the EU after claiming that the MEP leading the report was biased against Bulgarian interests. According to allegations by the Bulgarian MEPs, the lawmaker in charge of the report, Austrian MEP Thomas Waitz, ignored violence against the Bulgarian population in North Macedonia at the urging of the country’s delegation — but according to Waitz himself, all he had done was merely push back on Bulgarian attempts to de-emphasize the recognition of a unique Macedonian identity in North Macedonia. In addition, Waitz accused the Bulgarian side of using “smear campaigns” and false accusations of corruption to disparage the report, and received threatening personal messages after his phone number was leaked to the Right-wing Bulgarian blogosphere.

Why it matters: Bulgaria has for decades alleged that Macedonians in North Macedonia are in fact an offshoot of the Bulgarian nation with shared linguistic and historical roots — all of which the Macedonians have denied. While this is not the first time that North Macedonia’s accession process has been held up by these ethnic grievances, it shows the lengths to which both sides are willing to go to to preserve what they see as their national honor amid the negotiations. While North Macedonia will almost certainly join the EU sooner or later, it may eventually be forced to placate Bulgaria by making painful concessions on its official national narrative, just as it had when it was forced to change its official name to satisfy Greece several years ago.

5. Estonia struck a deal with Sweden to lease prison space to house 600 Swedish prisoners, raising ethics concerns

Sweden and Estonia announced last week that they had reached a prison lease agreement in which Stockholm would ship up to 600 prisoners to Tartu, Estonia for up to 30 million euros. The move aims to alleviate overcrowding in Swedish prisons, where space has been running out amid a gang crime wave in the country, and is key component of a coalition agreement between governing parties. The deal remains controversial in Sweden, and is not universally supported.

Why it matters: The Sweden-Estonia agreement comes on the heels of other similar deals in past years, including one where Denmark would send its prisoners to Kosovo. Most recently, Italy and Albania have also been working towards a deal in which Italy would offshore asylum seekers to Albania while their cases were being evaluated or while awaiting deportation, raising human rights red flags. Such transfers do pose ethnical concerns, especially in situations where two countries have dramatically different incarceration laws. But more broadly, this latest deal highlights a larger pattern where Eastern European states are being used as cheap holding cells for undesirables in Western Europe — setting up a relationship that, while mutually beneficial for the time being, has the potential to become increasingly exploitative.

The Eastern Flank

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