Bonus Post: Russia's Escalating Yet Clumsy Hybrid War in Europe
Russia's ramped up sabotage operations have made headlines, but have also exposed its operational weaknesses
Note: In the interest of adding more analytical depth to my coverage in The Eastern Flank, I’ll be publishing longer posts like this every so often that discuss my take on regional trends in Eastern Europe. Although this post is free for all subscribers, I will aim to eventually make these posts for paid subscribers only in the future. If you enjoy articles like these, consider upgrading to paid to support my work and get even more out of this newsletter. Thanks!
Since I started publishing The Eastern Flank in January, Russian covert operations in Europe have significantly increased in frequency and scope. Most recently, as I wrote in last week’s issue, a GRU-directed cyberattack targeted state institutions in Czechia, a major political party in Germany, and allegedly bodies in Poland as well. Previously, last month, Polish authorities arrested individuals involved in an attack on a Russian dissident in Lithuania and one person gathering intelligence for Russia on a Polish airport in connection with an apparent plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In March, a joint Polish-Czech operation exposed a Russian spy ring in Poland and a Russian-backed influence operation operating out of Prague, while suspected Russian agents were arrested in Estonia in February for attacking the cars of the Interior Minister and local journalists. Russian GPS jamming has also disrupted flights across the Baltic region, and outside of Eastern Europe, Russian-directed attacks or sabotage attempts have also taken place at military bases in Germany and a warehouse in the UK.
Last week, a significant report from the Financial Times put all of this in context — German, Estonian, French, and other European intelligence and defense agencies have concluded that Russian services are becoming much more willing to engage in brazen and violent attacks across Europe, with little regard for collateral damage. According to Bloomberg, one senior European official has reportedly concluded that the increasingly unhinged nature of these acts means that Russia may no longer care about keeping a low profile in its hybrid warfare activities, and is comfortable openly acting against the west unlike ever before.
While none of this is good news, it is important to highlight why Russia is resorting to such measures — put quite simply, it has run out of other options to influence events in the EU and NATO, and its reach on the continent is far smaller than it has been since the fall of the Soviet Union.
As FT aptly points out, over 600 Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover were forced to leave the EU in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, decimating Moscow’s espionage capabilities. This is a large part of the reason why many of the sabotage operations that have made news in the last few months have been carried out not by professional Russian operatives as they have been in decades prior, but by local Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Bulgarians, and other nationals whom Russia has tried to hire via social media to carry out its hybrid warfare operations. Relying on regular people rather than its own security staff means that Russian-led acts of sabotage in Europe are bound to be much more brazen and brute-force, but also simpler, clumsier, and more susceptible to detection and failure.
At the moment, it seems that Russia is willing to take such risks because it has little to lose given its near-total ostracization from European politics, and because using whatever means possible to undermine the European defense sector, and by proxy its diplomatic and material support for Ukraine, has become a national security priority. Despite the Kremlin’s bluster about launching strikes at NATO assets and military bases, triggering a NATO Article V response very clearly continues to be a red line for Putin, narrowing his field of movement to the sorts of indirect, thuggish operations we’ve seen lately.
But as FT also reports, Russia’s myriad security services have also been centralizing their activities through Kremlin-managed “Committees of Special Influence” responsible for operations within specific countries, bringing together a variety of previously uncoordinated intelligence activities under one umbrella. This means that in addition to becoming more frequent and more violent, Russian sabotage operations are likely to be more focused moving forward, with moving parts potentially across various countries.
Although Russia has indeed carried out actions this year in countries including Germany, the UK, and Sweden, it is almost certain that the vast majority of its future operations will be focused on the Baltic states, Poland, and other states on NATO’s periphery. What countries like these should prepare for at this immediate phase is not the Russian invasion European governments have so eagerly been warning about this year, but a dramatic increase in violent hybrid operations which will pose a much greater risk for daily life than the Russian military itself will anytime soon. Even though Russia has a weaker hand in Europe than it’s had in decades, it can still cause chaos even if it fails to meaningfully achieve its goals.