Biden Has Cost Eastern Europe its Security

The potential consequences of Joe Biden's jaw-dropping debate loss will be enormous for NATO's eastern members

(Screenshot via 11Alive on YouTube)

The disbelief American Democrats felt while watching Thursday’s presidential debate was likely only outmatched by the horror Central and Eastern Europeans experienced as they watched their security guarantees evaporating before their eyes.

“Supporting Trump is inconsistent with Poland’s raison d’etre,” wrote one Polish poster on X in response to Donald Trump suggesting he might not come to the aid of European NATO states in the event of a Russian invasion if they fail to meet defense spending targets. This is a threat he had made in the past, but in the context of the war in Ukraine and an escalating hybrid war across Europe including in Poland, it felt more ominous now than ever before.

Yet most ominous of all was watching the only man standing between Trump and the White House, Joe Biden, appear to be completely asleep at the wheel, speaking more incoherently than ever, reassuring absolutely no one as to his mental stamina to continue serving as president. After the debate, Democrats scrambled to figure out what to do next, considering pressuring Biden to withdraw from the race in hopes of nominating someone more competent for the job. But the writing on the wall was clear — barring a miracle, Trump would by all odds return to office in 2025.

For Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, and beyond, this was the nightmare scenario they had long feared most. Many factors are still up in the air about Trump’s policy towards Russia’s war and European security writ large, but a second Trump presidency will undoubtedly mean less military aid (if any) for Ukraine, a significant fracturing within NATO, and an emboldened Russia across the continent.

It is no exaggeration to say that, despite the heroism of Ukraine’s soldiers, Kyiv’s success on the battlefield has depended almost entirely on access to American weapons. American officials have been working to “Trump-proof” future military shipments for Ukraine but have for the most part come up short, meaning US support for Ukraine will fall squarely into Trump’s hands upon his return to office. In a best-case scenario, in his quest for foreign policy wins, Trump might send one or two symbolic aid packages to Ukraine, but will continue to push for negotiations between Zelensky and Putin while withholding further carrots until his conditions are met. Ukraine will by definition have an enormous disadvantage in such negotiations, and caught between and a rock and a hard place, Zelensky will likely be coerced into capitulating to Russia and handing over Ukraine’s eastern territories, thus opening the door for Russia to continue its quest to rebuild its former sphere of influence across Eastern Europe. Ukraine may opt to refuse to enter negotiations under such conditions, but it won’t hold out for long on the battlefield. Sooner or later, without substantive American assistance, Zelensky will be forced to play by Trump’s rules.

Without robust assurances that Trump, who sees support for NATO as a net loss for the United States, would come to the aid of countries like the Baltics, NATO’s European members would find themselves struggling to find ways to supplement American military strength on their own. While countries like Poland have spent several years now preparing for such a scenario, the combined power of Europe’s militaries and defense industry remains a far cry from the might of the United States, and Putin knows this well. Europeans have taken great steps in rectifying this imbalance, but production of equipment like ammunition is lagging behind targets, the continent’s military-industrial complex remains divided between a variety of different markets, and Europe’s capacity to replace American military manufacturing power remains many years away.

Those are years Europe simply does not have. While a Trump win will not necessarily guarantee a wider war in Europe, it will most certainly strengthen Russia’s hand, give it space to assert itself militarily on NATO’s borders in ways that it has not done so far, and move newly freed-up resources from the war in Ukraine to vulnerable parts of Russia’s western frontier. But with a Europe that has for years been hampered by a dependency on the US now at his mercy, Putin may indeed decide to risk a wider conflagration if it means fueling his nationalist, war-driven political machine at home. After all, would European countries really be able (or willing) to stop a Russian incursion into Estonia if they didn’t have a friendly American army on the way?

While such speculations have been swirling for months, they are now top-of-mind for Europeans living in Russia’s shadow after Biden’s disastrous performance. For Ukrainians, Biden’s failure may prove to be the death knell in their country’s quest for freedom. And come November, Poles, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and others may well see the American security blanket they had grown accustomed to over the last twenty years become suddenly pulled out from over them, forcing them to put their radical new post-2022 defense calculus into overdrive. After Thursday, these are the realities Europe must not only prepare for, but also expect.