Biden allows Ukraine to use ATACMS against Russian territory, Zelensky condemns Scholz's call with Putin, and the US opens its first permanent base in Poland
November 13-17 in Eastern Europe
What You Need To Know:
This roundup combines last week’s top news with important underreported stories
1. In a major shift, Biden gave Ukraine permission to strike Russian territory with American long-range missiles
On Sunday, after months of pleas from Ukrainian officials, the Biden administration officially gave Ukraine permission to use American-made Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, against Russian positions in Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian forces have been occupying territory since August. According to the Biden administration, the move was meant as a response to the arrival of North Korean soldiers on the battlefield in Kursk, which it views as a major escalation of the war.
Why it matters: This permission to use US-made, long-range missiles against Russian territory is the largest change in American Ukraine policy this year. Although Biden had previously allowed Ukrainian forces to use HIMARS against Russia in the vicinity of Kharkiv, this latest move is more significant, given that ATACMS have a range of up to 190 miles or 300 km. This will give Ukraine the ability to strike military staging areas, airfields, bases, and groupings of North Korean soldiers in Russia as far away as Tula Oblast, which borders Moscow Oblast. Although US officials don’t expect it to alter the status quo on the battlefield on its own, it may allow Ukraine to degrade Russia’s military capabilities as Moscow seeks to mount attacks against Ukrainian forces in Kursk and continue its bombardment of Ukrainian civilian areas. The fact this permission was given so soon before Trump returns to power in Washington indicates that Biden sees this as a way to strengthen Kyiv’s hand before impending negotiations. Yet, looking even further, Russia will continue to pose a threat to NATO beyond the eventual end of the war in Ukraine, meaning that allowing Kyiv to unleash hell upon Russia deep into its territory may prove to be an insurance policy against future Russian expansionist desires, even if it achieves some of its aims in Ukraine.
2. Zelensky condemned Scholz’s call with Putin as Japan’s FM visited Kyiv over North Korean involvement in the war
In the wake of Trump’s election in the US, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called Putin for the first time since 2022, speaking to the Russian leader for about an hour about ending the war, condemning Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure, and potential future contacts. Ukraine’s Zelensky condemned the call however, saying it worked against the long-time campaign to keep Putin isolated and had the dangerous potential to normalize contact between the West and the Kremlin. Also last week, following Russia’s deployment of North Korean troops against Ukrainian forces, Japan’s foreign Minister visited Kyiv to express “concern” over the move, promising future aid packages for Ukraine.
Why it matters: Trump’s win has recalibrated the calculations of Europeans about the war in Ukraine, leaving some like Scholz to opt for a return to what Germans had seen as a pragmatic engagement with Moscow before the war. In this sense, Scholz’s call is a sign that many in Europe see Trump’s election as a signal that the days of isolating Putin may be drawing to a close — while embracing him remains off the table, for Scholz, engaging with him directly has become unavoidable. Despite Zelensky’s misgivings about the move, Scholz’s move is only one approach to the looming new Trump-era reality in Europe — for many in the content’s east, most notably Poland and the Baltic states, Trump’s return means that the onus of guarding NATO from Russia may fall to them, leading them to only harden their stance against Moscow. Meanwhile, Japan’s outreach toward Ukraine showcases the deep anxieties that North Korea’s involvement in the war has elicited in East Asia, where the Ukraine conflict is becoming increasingly linked not only to tensions on the Korean peninsula, but also to the jostling between the American and Chinese spheres in the western Pacific.
3. As Trump vows to withdraw from Europe, Poland celebrated the opening of the first permanent US base in the country
The US opened its first permanent base in Poland on Wednesday in the town of Redzikowo near the country’s Baltic Coast. Having been in the works since the 2000s, the new base will be part of the pan-NATO Aegis Shore missile defense shield along with a base in Romania, and has been hailed by Polish leaders as a signal of America’s commitment to Polish security and Poland’s position outside Russia’s sphere.
Why it matters: At a time when doubts about US commitment to European security are sky high after Trump’s election, the opening of this base in Poland shows that decoupling America entirely from Europe and especially NATO’s East will be no easy task. While Trump will likely make waves in terms of America’s presence on the European continent, the opening of installations like the new base in Poland, along with limited efforts to Trump-proof American aid to Ukraine and participation in NATO, will likely mean that he will not be able to wholly extricate America from the continent. Nevertheless, Polish leaders’ efforts to reassure themselves that the US under Trump will continue to be as supportive of Poland as Biden was may prove to be wishful thinking at best.
4. Protests rocked Georgia as the country’s electoral commission confirmed the ruling pro-Russian party’s contested election win
Weeks after parliamentary elections last month that saw the ruling pro-Russian Georgian Dream party declare victory amid widespread voting irregularities, Georgia’s electoral commission officially confirmed the election result, as opposition-led protests continued throughout the capital Tbilisi, including at the commission’s headquarters. Meanwhile, unrelated protests also took erupted in Georgia’s Russian-occupied breakaway region of Abkhazia, where locals demonstrated against a bill that would allow for increased Russian investment and land ownership in the region.
Why it matters: Protests have continued unabated in the Georgian capital ever since Georgian Dream’s contested electoral win, with fears mounting about the state of Georgia’s democracy and the country’s drift toward Russia. Despite the opposition’s stated commitment to boycotting parliament as Georgian Dream tries to consolidate its new term in government, how it goes about removing Georgian Dream from power remains uncertain, but the persistence of street protests continues to showcase the popular anger in Georgia against the ruling party. In Abkhazia, the protests there are a sign that Russian power has its limits even in a region squarely within Russia’s sphere of control — meaning that the combined reality of the two separate protest movements in both occupied and sovereign Georgia may make politics in the country more troublesome for the Kremlin than it might have expected. For specifics on how the election and its aftermath may push Georgia further toward Moscow, check out this reported piece I co-authored in Foreign Policy last week from Tbilisi.
5. Slovakia’s new draft law banning minority languages has threatened the country’s alliance with Hungary
Slovakia’s populist government has drafted a new bill that would ban minority languages everywhere from public transportation to restaurant menus, in a move that is aimed almost entirely at the use of Hungarian by the Hungarian minority living primarily in southern Slovakia. Although human rights experts have condemned the bill, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó stated that he had gotten a “guarantee” from Slovak lawmakers that any such law would not affect the use of the Hungarian language in the country.
Why it matters: The language issue is a rare spat between the governments of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and Slovak PM Robert Fico, who have grown closer diplomatically due to their opposition to NATO and EU support for Ukraine. Szijjártó’s claim about guarantees may be an effort to limit the fallout around the draft bill before it becomes law, but in practical terms, a bill of this sort that would not apply to the Hungarian language would not make political sense to implement. The bill is likely meant as fodder for Fico’s populist base, and underscores the fundamental contradiction between his closeness to Orbán and his nationalist credentials at home. Nevertheless, whichever way the law’s passage goes, the Hungarian government appears to be closely following developments around the bill, raising question marks about the future of the Fico-Orbán axis.
Other stories to watch:
— How a Corruption ‘Carousel’ Got Fugitives Off Interpol’s Red Notice List (The New York Times)
— Belarus has arrested scores of relatives of dissidents ahead of presidential vote, activists say (Associated Press)
— NATO completes first large-scale military exercise in Latvia (Euronews)
— Poland condemns vandalism after Warsaw Ghetto Uprising memorial sprayed with red paint (Times of Israel)
— EU needs to rethink Russian sanctions to cut energy costs, Hungary's Orban says (Reuters)
— Kosovo-Romania match abandoned after players walk off pitch following pro-Serbia chants (Reuters)
— Aid groups say Italy-Albania migration deal violates medical ethics (ABC News)